Egypt: Alternative follow-up report to the UN Committee against Torture – 2024

January 2025

Table of Contents

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 24 October 2024, the Egyptian government submitted its follow-up report to the United Nations Committee against Torture (CAT) in response to the Committee’s concluding observations, which required Egypt to report on its progress in implementing Recommendations 12(e), 22(a), and 38(b), one year after its fifth periodic review.
2. Egypt’s follow-up report once again reflects the government’s systematic policy of denial regarding the widespread human rights violations committed by State authorities. Egypt’s legal framework remains largely flawed and falls short of meeting international human rights law and standards, as will be explained below. In addition to failing to address the continuous shortcomings in its legislation, Egypt’s follow-up report dismisses the stark disconnect between legislative frameworks and actual practices which continue to violate human rights on a large scale—an issue that the CAT has repeatedly noted. In light of these shortcomings, this report seeks to critically counter the Egyptian government’s follow-up report and provide an accurate assessment of the country’s failure to implement key CAT recommendations.

II. METHODOLOGY

1. This alternative follow-up report is co-submitted by the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), the Egyptian Front for Human Rights (EFHR), and the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) and endorsed by Egyptian independent human rights organizations—the Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms (ECRF), and El-Nadeem Center—as well as international organizations, including the Danish Institute against Torture (Dignity).
2. The information presented is based on the monitoring and documentation efforts of our different organizations, utilizing both primary and secondary sources. These include victims’ testimonies, accounts from victims’ families and legal representatives, court documents, media reports, and an analysis of Egyptian legislation.

III. ANALYSIS OF FOLLOW-UP RECOMMENDATIONS

1. State of emergency and counterterrorism (Recommendation 12 (e))

1. The Egyptian government’s response to Recommendation 12 (e)¹ of the CAT emphasizes, in paragraph 1, the cessation of the state of emergency since October 2021, “therefore, Emergency Act 162 of 1958 is no longer in effect.” In contrast to the government’s claims, the institutional practices established during the enforcement of Emergency Act No. 162 persist, and the legacy of its measures continues to undermine guarantees of fair trial rights and judicial independence.

2. Despite the formal lifting of the state of emergency, Emergency State Security Courts (ESSCs) continue to exercise jurisdiction over the cases referred to them during it. Article 19 of Emergency Act No. 162 permits these trials to proceed², in direct violation of the principle that ordinary courts should have primary jurisdiction over criminal cases. As a result, defendants prosecuted before the ESSCs—including those sentenced to death, individuals tried in absentia, and those whose cases were reopened by presidential order—remain subjected to exceptional judicial proceedings that lack fundamental fair trial safeguards and constitutional guarantees³, in violation of Article 4 of the ICCPR, which strictly limits derogations from fundamental rights even in times of emergency.

3. Emergency Law 162 grants the President sweeping executive, legislative, and judicial powers, including appointing judges, halting investigations, ordering retrials, and altering sentences⁴. Article 20 allows the President to order retrials before ESSCs even after the emergency’s end and to confirm, modify, annul, or suspend verdicts issued by these courts before its termination. This blatant violation of the separation of powers further entrenches executive control over the judiciary and undermines judicial independence and due process.

4. In paragraph 2, the government references Supreme Constitutional Court rulings 1/2015⁵ and 74/2023⁶ as affirming the constitutionality of the Emergency Act and framing it as a necessary tool for addressing extraordinary threats. While these rulings may have implicitly validated the legal framework, they also emphasized that emergency measures must adhere to the principles of proportionality, legality, and temporality. However, in practice, the application of emergency powers has repeatedly violated these principles and served instead to bypass legislative and judicial oversight⁷, which directly contradicts Egypt’s claim that it upholds judicial safeguards in its implementation of emergency measures.

5. The government also claims that administrative detention was abolished after Article 3 of the Emergency Act was ruled unconstitutional and replaced by judicially sanctioned pretrial detention under Law No. 12 of 2017. However, this amendment introduced Articles 3 bis (b) and 3 bis (c), which effectively reinstate broad detention powers. Article 3 bis (b) allows security forces to arrest individuals and conduct searches without prior judicial approval, requiring only post-facto notification to the Public Prosecution within 24 hours, with detention extendable for up to seven days. Article 3 bis (c) permits State Security District Courts (SSDCs) to detain individuals deemed a “danger to public security” for renewable one-month periods, allowing indefinite detention without trial—an unconstitutional practice that lacks due process safeguards.

Recommendations

1. Amend Emergency Act No. 162 of 1958 to ensure that emergency measures are narrowly defined, time-bound, subject to judicial review, and respect non-derogable rights, including due process, fair trial guarantees, and the absolute prohibition of torture.
2. Amend Counter-Terrorism Laws No. 94 and No. 8 of 2015 to bring them in line with Egypt’s human rights obligations under international law by narrowing the overly broad and vague definitions of terrorism and related crimes, ensuring fair trial guarantees, and strengthening judicial independence.
3. Abolish the use of Emergency State Security Courts and special terrorism circuits for civilians, refer all pending cases to the competent ordinary court system, and ensure retrials in civil courts for civilians previously convicted by military courts or special courts when their charges relate to the exercise of basic freedoms.
4. Repeal Decision 8901 of 2021, which allows remote renewal of pretrial detention without adequate judicial oversight and defendant participation, and ensure any future system guarantees transparency, fairness, and the right to challenge detention.
5. Immediately and unconditionally release all individuals detained solely for exercising their rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly, and ensure the release of those held arbitrarily, including in prolonged pretrial detention without trial or the possibility of judicial review.
6. End the practice of charging defendants in new cases based on similar facts, commonly called “rotation.”
7. Establish an independent oversight mechanism to investigate and report on the misuse of Emergency and Anti-Terrorism legislation, including cases of arbitrary detention, unfair trials, and enforced disappearances, and ensure accountability for officials responsible for violations.

2. Detention conditions (Recommendation 22 (a))

1. In its response to Recommendation 22 (a)⁸, Egypt claims progress in addressing prolonged pretrial detention and prison overcrowding through legislative amendments and highlights the drafting of a new Code of Criminal Procedure in December 2024. While the Egyptian government asserts that the law aims to enhance judicial efficiency, its core provisions instead strengthen prosecutorial power at the expense of judicial oversight and reinforce the already unchecked authority of security forces⁹.
2. The proposed legislation poses a serious threat to due process and the integrity of the justice system. It introduces provisions that would normalize warrantless searches, weaken the role of defense lawyers, and criminalize trial monitoring, among other alarming changes¹⁰, in direct contravention of Egypt’s obligations under international fair trial standards, including the ICCPR and UNCAT, and risks further institutionalizing impunity.
3. Despite widespread opposition from both national¹¹ and international¹² actors, the Egyptian Parliament approved the law “in principle” in December 2024¹³, signaling a troubling shift away from legal safeguards and accountability. Throughout 2024, our organizations have repeatedly warned that this law could further entrench systematic repression rather than serve as a genuine reform measure.
4. Egypt’s claim, in paragraph 11, that its detention facilities align with the Nelson Mandela Rules is contradicted by overwhelming evidence of inhumane treatment, inadequate medical care, and poor living conditions¹⁴. The Nelson Mandela Rules prohibit torture and require humane treatment of detainees. However, the “No Statute of Limitations” Campaign has documented, throughout 2024¹⁵, systematic torture and ill-treatment in both old and newly constructed Egyptian prisons, including prolonged isolated confinement, inappropriate lighting, lack of privacy, and exile through transfers to distant prisons—practices often targeting political prisoners and activists¹⁶.
5. Deliberate medical neglect and delayed access to essential healthcare in detention have led to at least 50 preventable deaths across police stations, official prisons, and unofficial detention centers in 2024 alone¹⁷. El-Nadeem Center has documented cases involving the torture of at least 55 individuals and collective punishment of 94 detainees in places of deprivation of liberty within the same year¹⁸.
6. In paragraph 20, the government cites the establishment of new prison complexes, such as Badr and Wadi Al-Natrun, as evidence of reform. However, these facilities have replicated the patterns of abuse seen in older prisons¹⁹. Throughout 2024, severe restrictions on family visits, denial of medical treatment, and harsh disciplinary measures were thoroughly documented²⁰. The introduction of new prisons has not resulted in improved detention conditions but rather expanded the infrastructure for ongoing abuses.
7. The inhumane detention conditions, deliberately imposed as punitive measures to dehumanize prisoners and suppress any form of resistance or protest, have driven many detainees in multiple prisons to initiate hunger strikes. In extreme desperation, some have even attempted suicide as a final act of defiance²¹. In October 2023, a coalition of local and international organizations submitted to CAT a detailed legal analysis concluding that the Egyptian authorities’ use of torture is so widespread and systematic that it amounts to a crime against humanity under customary international law, to which Egypt is bound²².
8. Regarding the reduction of overcrowding through alternatives to pretrial detention, Egypt enumerates, in paragraphs 12 and 13, the alternatives under Article 201 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, a closer analysis reveals a stark contrast between these reported measures and the realities on the ground. The systematic overuse of pretrial detention and its application as a punitive measure against political dissidents, journalists, and human rights defenders have rendered these alternatives ineffective in reducing overcrowding.
9. Despite the availability of alternatives, pretrial detention remains the default practice, routinely applied without adequate judicial oversight and is rarely considered in politically sensitive cases or for individuals arrested under vague charges such as “spreading false news” or “joining a banned group”²³. Thousands of individuals remain in pretrial detention—many for years—without trial or conviction²⁴, exacerbating prison overcrowding. Judicial oversight of pretrial detention remains weak, which continues to enable authorities to detain individuals indefinitely under politically motivated charges.
10. In paragraph 16, Egypt cites the number of presidential pardons and conditional releases as evidence of efforts to alleviate overcrowding. While these measures have led to the release of some detainees, they fail to address the root causes of mass incarceration and are often applied selectively. Presidential pardons predominantly benefit individuals convicted of non-political offenses, while political prisoners and prisoners of conscience remain behind bars²⁵. The process lacks transparency and the criteria for selection remain unclear, further demonstrating its arbitrary nature.

3. Death penalty (Recommendation 38 (b))

1. In its response to Recommendation 38 (b)²⁶, Egypt outlines various measures purportedly taken to align the use of the death penalty with international human rights standards. In paragraphs 22 and 24, Egypt highlights recent legislative amendments, particularly adjustments to Law 394 of 1954 on Weapons and Ammunition, which allow courts to mitigate certain punishments. However, despite government claims, Egypt has yet to eliminate mandatory death penalties for other crimes—a practice that directly contradicts international law’s requirement of individualized sentencing. This rigidity undermines judicial discretion and prevents consideration of mitigating circumstances.
2. The government also asserts, in paragraph 23, that the death penalty is limited to the “most serious crimes,” particularly terrorism and intentional killing. However, Egyptian law continues to define 105 offenses as punishable by death, including crimes under the Penal Code and its amendments (58/1937), Military Provisions Law (25/1966), Weapons and Ammunition Law (394/1954), Organ Transplant Law (142/2017) and Anti-Narcotics Law (182/1960)²⁷. Many of these crimes do not meet the “most serious crimes” threshold under international law.
3. Anti-Terrorism legislation also contains vague and overly broad provisions that extend the death penalty beyond cases involving lethal intent, criminalizing acts such as “endangering public order” or “disrupting the work of authorities.” This allows for arbitrary and politically motivated executions²⁸, violating Article 6(2) of the ICCPR and Article 16 of UNCAT. Instead of ensuring the right to life is protected, these laws turn the death penalty into the norm rather than the exception.
4. Civilians, including children²⁹, have been repeatedly tried in military courts³⁰, where due process rights are severely curtailed. Confessions obtained under torture or coercion are routinely used as evidence in capital cases³¹, despite this violating both the UNCAT and ICCPR. In some cases, drug-related offenses—which do not meet the “most serious crimes” threshold under international law—have also led to death sentences³².
5. The adoption of Law No. 1 of 2024, introducing criminal appeals in death penalty cases, fails to address the root causes of wrongful convictions—such as coerced confessions, unfair trials, and political influence over the judiciary. The continued use of mass trials and group executions of political opponents, in proceedings lacking even basic legal safeguards³³, demonstrates the death penalty’s misuse as a tool of repression rather than justice.
6. Egypt claims that capital cases benefit from procedural safeguards, such as mandatory review and unanimous consent by the Court of Cassation, consultation with the Grand Mufti, and prohibitions against imposing the death penalty on juveniles and pregnant women. However, these safeguards are largely symbolic. The Grand Mufti’s opinion is non-binding and lacks transparency, with decisions perceived as political formalities rather than substantive legal reviews³⁴. Judicial rulings, particularly in cases involving terrorism or dissent, are heavily influenced by political pressure.
7. Despite legal protections for certain groups, the death penalty disproportionately affects marginalized and vulnerable individuals, particularly those from lower socio-economic backgrounds who lack resources for proper legal representation. While pregnant women are exempt from execution until two years postpartum, this does not address broader gender-based discrimination within the justice system, which often fails to consider domestic abuse and other mitigating factors. In addition, juveniles have been sentenced to death in violation of international standards, with authorities manipulating age documentation or disregarding minors’ rights³⁵.
8. In paragraph 25, Egypt asserts that the application of the death penalty is a sovereign matter shaped by societal traditions and cultural context. However, sovereignty does not exempt Egypt from its binding obligations under international law. The ICCPR and UNCAT, which Egypt has ratified, impose clear restrictions on the death penalty and require compliance with fundamental human rights standards. Cultural and societal considerations cannot justify violations of these obligations, nor can they serve as a defense against legitimate international scrutiny.
9. Procedural safeguards alone cannot compensate for a fundamentally flawed justice system. In 2024 alone, a total of 380 individuals were sentenced to death in 255 different cases, including 31 individuals charged in nine different political cases. In addition, the Court of Cassation upheld the death sentences of 35 individuals, and 13 executions were carried out³⁶.
10. Egypt’s response to Recommendation 38 (b) fails to demonstrate any tangible progress toward aligning the country’s use of the death penalty with international human rights standards. Instead of substantive reforms, the government repeats previous justifications, ignores calls for accountability, and continues to implement the death penalty in a manner inconsistent with its obligations under the ICCPR and UNCAT. Until the structural issues are addressed, Egypt’s use of the death penalty will continue to constitute a serious human rights violation.