Egypt: Alternative follow-up report to the UN Committee against Torture – 2024

January 2025

Table of Contents

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 24 October 2024, the Egyptian government submitted its follow-up report to the United Nations Committee against Torture (CAT) in response to the Committee’s concluding observations, which required Egypt to report on its progress in implementing Recommendations 12(e), 22(a), and 38(b), one year after its fifth periodic review.
2. Egypt’s follow-up report once again reflects the government’s systematic policy of denial regarding the widespread human rights violations committed by State authorities. Egypt’s legal framework remains largely flawed and falls short of meeting international human rights law and standards, as will be explained below. In addition to failing to address the continuous shortcomings in its legislation, Egypt’s follow-up report dismisses the stark disconnect between legislative frameworks and actual practices which continue to violate human rights on a large scale—an issue that the CAT has repeatedly noted. In light of these shortcomings, this report seeks to critically counter the Egyptian government’s follow-up report and provide an accurate assessment of the country’s failure to implement key CAT recommendations.

II. METHODOLOGY

1. This alternative follow-up report is co-submitted by the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), the Egyptian Front for Human Rights (EFHR), and the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) and endorsed by Egyptian independent human rights organizations—the Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms (ECRF) and El-Nadeem Center—as well as international organizations, including the Danish Institute against Torture (Dignity).
2. The information presented is based on the monitoring and documentation efforts of our different organizations, utilizing both primary and secondary sources. These include victims’ testimonies, accounts from victims’ families and legal representatives, court documents, media reports, and an analysis of Egyptian legislation.

III. ANALYSIS OF FOLLOW-UP RECOMMENDATIONS

1. State of emergency and counterterrorism (Recommendation 12(e))

1. The Egyptian government’s response to Recommendation 12(e)¹ of the CAT emphasizes, in paragraph 1, the cessation of the state of emergency since October 2021, “therefore, Emergency Act 162 of 1958 is no longer in effect.” In contrast to the government’s claims, the institutional practices established during the enforcement of Emergency Act No. 162 persist, and the legacy of its measures continues to undermine guarantees of fair trial rights and judicial independence.

2. Despite the formal lifting of the state of emergency, Emergency State Security Courts (ESSCs) continue to exercise jurisdiction over the cases referred to them. Article 19 of Emergency Act No. 162 permits these trials to proceed², in direct violation of the principle that ordinary courts should have primary jurisdiction over criminal cases. As a result, defendants prosecuted before the ESSCs—including those sentenced to death, individuals tried in absentia, and those whose cases were reopened by presidential order—remain subjected to exceptional judicial proceedings that lack fundamental fair trial safeguards and constitutional guarantees³, in violation of Article 4 of the ICCPR, which strictly limits derogations from fundamental rights even in times of emergency.

3. Emergency Law 162 grants the President sweeping executive, legislative, and judicial powers, including appointing judges, halting investigations, ordering retrials, and altering sentences⁴. Article 20 allows the President to order retrials before ESSCs even after the emergency’s end and to confirm, modify, annul, or suspend verdicts issued by these courts. This blatant violation of the separation of powers further entrenches executive control over the judiciary and undermines judicial independence and due process.

4. In paragraph 2, the government references Supreme Constitutional Court rulings 1/2015⁵ and 74/2023⁶ as affirming the constitutionality of the Emergency Act and framing it as a necessary tool for addressing extraordinary threats. While these rulings may have implicitly validated the legal framework, they also emphasized that emergency measures must adhere to the principles of proportionality, legality, and temporality. However, in practice, the application of emergency powers has repeatedly violated these principles and served instead to bypass legislative and judicial oversight⁷, which directly contradicts Egypt’s claim that it upholds judicial safeguards in its implementation of emergency measures.

5. The government also claims that administrative detention was abolished after Article 3 of the Emergency Act was ruled unconstitutional and replaced by judicially sanctioned pretrial detention under Law No. 12 of 2017. However, this amendment introduced Articles 3 bis (b) and 3 bis (c), which effectively reinstate broad detention powers. Article 3 bis (b) allows security forces to arrest individuals and conduct searches without prior judicial approval, requiring only post-facto notification to the Public Prosecution within 24 hours, with detention extendable for up to seven days. Article 3 bis (c) permits State Security District Courts (SSDCs) to detain individuals deemed a “danger to public security” for renewable one-month periods, allowing indefinite detention without trial—an unconstitutional practice that lacks due process safeguards. These provisions, with their vague definitions, enable arbitrary arrests and prolonged detentions⁸.

6. In addition, administrative detention has also been replicated in Anti-Terrorism legislation. Initially introduced to combat terrorism, Anti-Terrorism Law No. 94 of 2015 remains in force and incorporates provisions similar to those under the Emergency Act. It grants sweeping powers to security forces, including the right to arrest individuals, monitor communications, freeze assets, and impose travel bans without adequate judicial oversight.

7. The Anti-Terrorism Law’s vague definitions of “terrorist groups,” “terrorist crimes or acts,” and “terrorism financing” have been systematically misused to target peaceful activists and suppress actual or perceived critics of the government⁹. This has provided law enforcement and security forces with unchecked powers to commit human rights violations under the guise of counterterrorism and effectively extended a de facto state of emergency. Civilians continue to be tried in special terrorism circuits where due process guarantees are minimal or entirely absent¹⁰. Despite the absolute prohibition of torture under international law, coerced confessions remain admissible as evidence¹¹, in clear violation of Article 15 of UNCAT.
8. The adoption of Law 3 of 2024 further expands military authority over civilians by allowing military trials for offenses related to public facilities. The law’s vague terms and broad powers granted to the armed forces risk further eroding civilian oversight and fair trial rights and reinforcing military control over the justice system¹².
9. Despite the performative termination of the state of emergency, Emergency Act No. 162 remains functionally ineffective, with exceptional powers granted during the emergency becoming entrenched. Egypt has failed to amend Emergency Act No. 162, as recommended by CAT in Recommendation 12(e). Without substantive reforms—including amending Emergency Act No. 162 of 1958, Anti-Terrorism Laws No. 94 and No. 8 of 2015, and other repressive legislation—the Egyptian government continues to perpetuate a cycle of repression and impunity and remains non-compliant with CAT’s recommendations.

Recommendations

1. Amend Emergency Act No. 162 of 1958 to ensure that emergency measures are narrowly defined, time-bound, subject to judicial review, and respect non-derogable rights, including due process, fair trial guarantees, and the absolute prohibition of torture.
2. Amend Counter-Terrorism Laws No. 94 and No. 8 of 2015 to bring them in line with Egypt’s human rights obligations under international law by narrowing the overly broad and vague definitions of terrorism and related crimes, ensuring fair trial guarantees, and strengthening judicial independence.
3. Abolish the use of Emergency State Security Courts and special terrorism circuits for civilians, refer all pending cases to the competent ordinary court system, and ensure retrials in civil courts for civilians previously convicted by military courts or special courts when their charges relate to the exercise of basic freedoms.
4. Repeal Decision 8901 of 2021, which allows remote renewal of pretrial detention without adequate judicial oversight and defendant participation, and ensure any future system guarantees transparency, fairness, and the right to challenge detention.
5. Immediately and unconditionally release all individuals detained solely for exercising their rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly, and ensure the release of those held arbitrarily, including in prolonged pretrial detention without trial or the possibility of judicial review.
6. End the practice of charging defendants in new cases based on similar facts, commonly called “rotation.”
7. Establish an independent oversight mechanism to investigate and report on the misuse of Emergency and Anti-Terrorism legislation, including cases of arbitrary detention, unfair trials, and enforced disappearances, and ensure accountability for officials responsible for violations.

2. Detention conditions (Recommendation 22(a))

1. In its response to Recommendation 22(a)¹³, Egypt claims progress in addressing prolonged pretrial detention and prison overcrowding through legislative amendments and highlights the drafting of a new Code of Criminal Procedure in December 2024. While the Egyptian government asserts that the law aims to enhance judicial efficiency, its core provisions instead strengthen prosecutorial power at the expense of judicial oversight and reinforce the already unchecked authority of security forces¹⁴.
2. The proposed legislation poses a serious threat to due process and the integrity of the justice system. It introduces provisions that would normalize warrantless searches, weaken the role of defense lawyers, and criminalize trial monitoring, among other alarming changes¹⁵, in direct contravention of Egypt’s obligations under international fair trial standards, including the ICCPR and UNCAT, and risks further institutionalizing impunity.
3. Despite widespread opposition from both national¹⁶ and international¹⁷ actors, the Egyptian Parliament approved the law “in principle” in December 2024¹⁸, signaling a troubling shift away from legal safeguards and accountability. Throughout 2024, our organizations have repeatedly warned that this law could further entrench systematic repression rather than serve as a genuine reform measure.
4. Egypt’s claim, in paragraph 11, that its detention facilities align with the Nelson Mandela Rules is contradicted by overwhelming evidence of inhumane treatment, inadequate medical care, and poor living conditions¹⁹. The Nelson Mandela Rules prohibit torture and require humane treatment of detainees. However, the “No Statute of Limitations” Campaign has documented, throughout 2024²⁰, systematic torture and ill-treatment in both old and newly constructed Egyptian prisons, including prolonged solitary confinement, inappropriate lighting, lack of privacy, and exile through transfers to distant prisons—practices often targeting political prisoners and activists²¹.
5. Deliberate medical neglect and delayed access to essential healthcare in detention have led to at least 50 preventable deaths across police stations, official prisons, and unofficial detention centers in 2024 alone²². El-Nadeem Center has documented cases involving the torture of at least 55 individuals and collective punishment of 94 detainees in places of deprivation of liberty within the same year²³.
6. In paragraph 20, the government cites the establishment of new prison complexes, such as Badr and Wadi Al-Natrun, as evidence of reform. However, these facilities have replicated the patterns of abuse seen in older prisons²⁴.Throughout 2024, severe restrictions on family visits, denial of medical treatment, and harsh disciplinary measures were thoroughly documented²⁵. The introduction of new prisons has not resulted in improved detention conditions but rather expanded the infrastructure for ongoing abuses.
7. The inhumane detention conditions, deliberately imposed as punitive measures to dehumanize prisoners and suppress any form of resistance or protest, have driven many detainees in multiple prisons to initiate hunger strikes. In extreme desperation, some have even attempted suicide as a final act of defiance²⁶. In October 2023, a coalition of local and international organizations submitted to CAT a detailed legal analysis concluding that the Egyptian authorities’ use of torture is so widespread and systematic that it amounts to a crime against humanity under customary international law, to which Egypt is bound²⁷.
8. Regarding the reduction of overcrowding through alternatives to pretrial detention, Egypt enumerates, in paragraphs 12 and 13, the alternatives under Article 201 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, a closer analysis reveals a stark contrast between these reported measures and the realities on the ground. The systematic overuse of pretrial detention and its application as a punitive measure against political dissidents, journalists, and human rights defenders have rendered these alternatives ineffective in reducing overcrowding.
9. Despite the availability of alternatives, pretrial detention remains the default practice, routinely applied without adequate judicial oversight and is rarely considered in politically sensitive cases or for individuals arrested under vague charges such as “spreading false news” or “joining a banned group”²⁸. Thousands remain in pretrial detention—many for years—without trial or conviction²⁹, exacerbating prison overcrowding and enabling indefinite detention under politically motivated charges.
10. In paragraph 16, Egypt cites the number of presidential pardons and conditional releases as evidence of efforts to alleviate overcrowding. While these measures have led to the release of some detainees, they fail to address the root causes of mass incarceration and are often applied selectively. Presidential pardons predominantly benefit individuals convicted of non-political offenses, while political prisoners and prisoners of conscience remain behind bars³⁰. The process lacks transparency and clear criteria, further demonstrating its arbitrary nature.
11. Throughout 2024, EFHR monitored the performance of terrorism courts during the pretrial phase and found that they effectively ceased granting releases in State Security cases. Over the year, three terrorism courts held 104 sessions, issuing at least 45,965 detention renewal orders across 3,217 cases. In all sessions, the courts failed to issue a single release order³¹, reinforcing the systematic use of prolonged pretrial detention as a punitive measure.
12. While Egypt claims compliance with international standards, the absence of independent monitoring and oversight mechanisms over places of deprivation of liberty continues to undermine transparency. Independent CSOs and international bodies, including the ICRC, are denied access to detention facilities³², preventing accurate assessments and cultivating an environment where abuses thrive unchecked. Moreover, individuals and organizations documenting prison conditions or advocating for detainees’ rights are often subjected to harassment, intimidation, and arbitrary detention³³.
13. Egypt’s response to Recommendation 22(a) fails to demonstrate any tangible progress in improving detention conditions or reducing overcrowding. Instead of providing verifiable evidence of substantive reforms, the government reiterates claims from its fifth periodic report and has not presented disaggregated data on key indicators such as total prison population, offenses leading to arrests, or pretrial detention figures—data necessary for objective assessment.

3. Death penalty (Recommendation 38(b))

1. In its response to Recommendation 38(b)³⁴, Egypt outlines various measures purportedly taken to align the use of the death penalty with international human rights standards. In paragraphs 22 and 24, Egypt highlights recent legislative amendments, particularly adjustments to Law 394 of 1954 on Weapons and Ammunition, which allow courts to mitigate certain punishments. However, despite government claims, Egypt has yet to eliminate mandatory death penalties for other crimes—a practice that directly contradicts international law’s requirement of individualized sentencing, undermining judicial discretion.
2. The government asserts that the death penalty is limited to the “most serious crimes,” particularly terrorism and intentional killing. However, Egyptian law continues to define 105 offenses as punishable by death, including crimes under the Penal Code and its amendments (58/1937), Military Provisions Law (25/1966), Weapons and Ammunition Law (394/1954), Organ Transplant Law (142/2017), and Anti-Narcotics Law (182/1960)³⁵. Many do not meet the “most serious crimes” threshold.
3. Anti-Terrorism legislation contains vague provisions extending the death penalty beyond lethal intent, criminalizing acts such as “endangering public order” or “disrupting the work of authorities,” allowing arbitrary, politicized executions³⁶, violating Article 6(2) of the ICCPR and Article 16 of UNCAT.
4. Civilians, including children³⁷, have been tried in military courts³⁸, where due process rights are severely curtailed. Confessions obtained under torture or coercion are routinely used as evidence in capital cases³⁹, and drug-related offenses have led to death sentences, despite not meeting international thresholds⁴⁰.
5. Law No. 1 of 2024 introduced criminal appeals in death penalty cases but fails to address wrongful convictions, such as coerced confessions, unfair trials, and political influence. Mass trials and group executions in proceedings lacking basic safeguards demonstrate misuse⁴¹⁴².
6. Procedural safeguards—mandatory review by the Court of Cassation, consultation with the Grand Mufti, and exemptions for juveniles and pregnant women—are largely symbolic. The Grand Mufti’s opinion is non-binding and lacks transparency, with decisions seen as formality rather than substantive review⁴³.
7. The death penalty disproportionately affects marginalized individuals who lack legal resources. While pregnant women are exempt until two years postpartum, broader gender-based discrimination and juvenile executions persist in violation of standards⁴⁴.
8. In paragraph 25, Egypt asserts the death penalty as a sovereign matter shaped by traditions. Sovereignty, however, does not exempt Egypt from obligations under the ICCPR and UNCAT.
9. Procedural safeguards alone cannot compensate for a flawed system. In 2024 alone, 380 individuals were sentenced to death in 255 cases, including 31 political cases; the Court of Cassation upheld 35 death sentences, and 13 executions were carried out⁴⁵.
10. Egypt’s response to Recommendation 38(b) fails to show tangible progress. Instead of substantive reforms, the government repeats justifications, ignores calls for accountability, and continues inconsistent implementation. Until structural issues are addressed, Egypt’s use of the death penalty remains a serious violation.

Footnotes