Libyan Authorities Dismantling Civic Space through Regressive Laws and Abusive Practices

Report submitted to the 50th Session of the Universal Periodic Review

Submitted by:

Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies

The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) is an independent regional human rights organization established in 1994. For 30 years, CIHRS has maintained its presence as an effective organization based in the South (Egypt and Tunisia), with offices in some Northern countries (Switzerland, Belgium and France). It takes pride in its role of breaking barriers between peoples of the North and South by promoting transnational cultural and human rights cooperation. CIHRS builds the capacity of human rights organizations and forms coalitions and networks, striving for better representation in international human rights mechanisms that influence policies towards human rights and democracy issues in the Arab region. CIHRS enjoys special consultative status at the United Nations Economic and Social Council.

Introduction

1) Since the last Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in 2021, Libya’s legal framework governing civil society has become increasingly convoluted and fragmented. In lieu of meaningful reform, a proliferation of decrees has been introduced by Libyan authorities that further entrench executive control over civil society organizations (CSOs).

2) Libya’s current crackdown on civil society cannot be viewed in isolation. It reflects a broader pattern of repression, institutional fragmentation, and the entrenchment of authoritarian practices under the guise of national security and religious morality. Since the 2014 armed conflict, Libya has experienced competing governments, lack of constitutional clarity, and widespread insecurity — all of which have created fertile ground for arbitrary governance and shrinking civic space.

3) Despite being a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) since 1970, Libya continues to fail to meet its obligations under Article 22, which guarantees the right to freedom of association. Additionally, the Libyan Constitutional Declaration of 2011 commits to building a democratic state based on pluralism and respect for human rights. However, these commitments have been consistently undermined by successive decrees and legislation that grant unchecked powers to executive bodies.

4) In addition to state-imposed legal and administrative restrictions, CSOs in Libya operate in an environment dominated by militia groups and armed non-state actors who wield significant de facto authority, particularly in the absence of a unified national security apparatus. These groups often act with impunity, conducting raids on CSO offices, arbitrarily detaining activists, and threatening or coercing individuals engaged in human rights work. In many cases, they operate in coordination with — or parallel to — official institutions such as the Internal Security Agency (ISA) or local security directorates. The fragmentation of power and the lack of accountability for armed groups have further exacerbated the climate of fear and self-censorship, leaving CSOs vulnerable to both state and non-state repression. This toxic combination of overlapping legal restrictions, state sponsored repression, and militia violence significantly limits the safe space available for independent civic activity in Libya.

5) Libya has received multiple communications and concerns from UN Special Rapporteurs, notably the joint communication in October 2023,¹ which called out the arbitrary legal restrictions and security-driven attacks on civil society actors.

6) This Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) submission examines how the overlapping and contradictory nature of the laws and decrees applicable in Libya exacerbates repression, making it nearly impossible for civil society to operate independently. It also provides concrete recommendations for legislative reform to ensure that Libya upholds its human rights commitments.

Fragmented Legal Landscape and its Impact on Civil Society

7) Libya’s civil society sector is currently regulated by a confusing and inconsistent legal framework, consisting of multiple overlapping laws and decrees that place CSOs under complete executive control.

8) Historically, freedom of association was constitutionally protected in Libya under Article 26 of the 1951 Constitution. When Muammar Gaddafi came to power, this right was systematically dismantled. The 1969 Constitutional Declaration omitted any reference to freedom of association.

9) In 2001, Gaddafi introduced Law No. 19, which limited the scope of legal civic activity to CSOs that provide only social, cultural, sports, charitable, or humanitarian services, placing them under strict government supervision. This law made the establishment of associations contingent on executive approval, required authorities to authorize an association’s activities and membership, and granted the government power to dissolve, merge, or assign a temporary management committee to any organization without judicial oversight.

10) In addition to Law No. 19, the Gaddafi regime facilitated repression through Law No. 80 of 1975, amending and repealing certain provisions of the Penal Code.² This law provided for the death penalty for anyone who funds, organizes, calls for or manages ‘any assembly, organization, or formation prohibited by law’. These provisions remain in effect today and are frequently used to silence dissent and restrict civil society activities.

11) In 2011, the right of individuals to freely form an association was guaranteed by Libya’s newly issued Constitutional Declaration: Article 15 guaranteed the right of individuals to form civil society organizations under the regulation of a law to be issued by the nation’s legislative authority. Thus, the Constitutional Declaration of 1969 came to an end, and with it, all legislation, decisions, and laws of the Gaddafi regime and its executive bodies. Moreover, Article 6 of Law No. 29 on transitional justice, issued in 2013, established the illegitimacy of unjust legislation issued before 2011. This fully applies to Law No. 19 of 2001 on the freedom of association, and Law No. 80 of 1975 amending and repealing provisions of the Penal Code as later confirmed by a court order. The legislative authority was expected at the time to issue a new law regulating the work of CSOs in compliance with Libya’s 2011 Constitutional Declaration. This new law was to comply with Libya’s international obligations regarding freedom of association, even in exceptional cases, and to be consistent with the basic principles required in any national law regulating the work of CSOs. The prolonged absence of a new law on civil society, required by the Constitutional Declaration ten years ago, has opened the door for the executive authorities to encroach upon the jurisdiction of the legislative authorities in regulating civil work and forming local and international civil society organizations.

12) The authorities’ grip on civil society can be best encapsulated by their establishment of institutions dedicated to controlling the formation, functioning, and activities of organizations.

13) First, a Civil Society Commission (CSC) was established in Benghazi in eastern Libya through decrees numbered 12 of 2012 and 649 of 2013. The decrees assign the Commission the role of registering and authorizing CSOs and their activities and grant it wide discretionary power to determine which organizations may legally operate.

14) Following the outbreak of armed conflict in 2014, the Government of National Accord issued decrees numbered 1160 and 1605 in December 2018, establishing a parallel Civil Society Commission in Tripoli, in western Libya. The CSC has sweeping powers and oversight on civil society.

15) From 2016 to March 2023, governing authorities in the east and the west issued³ several executive decisions and administrative regulations that flout freedom of association, especially targeting and restricting human rights organizations that expose violations.

16) Among those are regulations 1 and 2 of 2016, issued by the head of the Eastern Government, Abdullah Al-Thani, and still applicable to organizations operating in eastern Libya, as well as Decision No. 286 of 2019 issued by the Presidential Council in Tripoli headed by Fayez al-Sarraj at that time, which is the implementing regulation of Decree 1605. Both decrees imposed onerous conditions on organizations to become registered and established an all-encompassing stranglehold on their activities, funding, and operations.

17) A ruling by the Expedited Matters Circuit of the South Benghazi Court on 18 July 2022 suspended the application of Decision No. 286, on the grounds that it imposed undue restrictions on civil society—restrictions that should fall solely under the jurisdiction of the legislative authorities. The ruling followed a complaint filed by the Libya Platform, a coalition of 14 organizations. However, rather than replacing the decision with legislation that aligns with international standards, authorities in western Libya continued to issue legal regulations that curtail freedom of association.

18) On 8 March 2023, the Legal Department of the Supreme Judicial Council in Tripoli issued a fatwa (opinion) declaring illegal all civil society organizations not registered under Law No. 19 of 2001. On 13 March 2023, the Foreign Affairs Department of the Prime Minister’s Office issued a memorandum also asserting the illegality of CSOs unregistered under Law 19. On 21 March 2023, the Government of National Unity in Tripoli issued Decree No. 7 of 2023, allowing local and foreign organizations to continue functioning temporarily until they are registered again under the authoritarian stipulations of Law 19. On 2 February 2023, Resolution No. 5 of the CSC affiliated to the Presidential Council in Tripoli has replicated and expanded the restrictions contained in Decree 286.

19) The current legal framework, applicable both in the east and west of the country, grants the CSC (with its eastern and western branches) large discretionary powers to stifle civic work and imposes conditions on civil society, as follows:

• Associations must obtain prior approval to open a bank account, and the CSC can freeze accounts if registration requirements are unmet.
• The applicable decrees complicate amendments to an association’s governing statute, allowing the CSC to approve or deny changes.
• The decrees give the CSC the power to dissolve an association without judicial review.
• Libyan CSOs are prohibited from receiving funding without the CSC’s prior approval. Failure to do so could result in their removal from the registry without judicial recourse.
• International organizations must also secure prior approval to operate in Libya, facing complex registration procedures and restrictions outlined in the decrees.
• Foreign associations must obtain permits two weeks in advance for events and adhere to nationality requirements for their representatives.
• The CSC can appoint a financial custodian for an association without court approval.

20) Organizations must navigate a lengthy and unpredictable registration process, which includes signing a pledge (Annex 4) not to communicate with foreign entities or receive funding from them without government approval. They are required to obtain permission from the CSC before receiving funding or implementing any projects, and their registration is only valid for one year, subject to renewal at the discretion of the authorities. The lack of a coherent legal framework has resulted in an environment where authorities can selectively apply different decrees to suppress civil society, creating legal ambiguity and administrative obstacles that hinder CSO operations.

Beyond the law: Incendiary rhetoric and abusive practices targeting civil society

21) Beyond the restrictive legal framework, Internal Security Agency (ISA) agents and armed groups operating in the east and the west have been involved in the unwarranted detention of individuals advocating for human rights and civil society, under the guise of safeguarding ‘values inherent to Libya and Islam’. The following are a few examples showing the authorities’ crackdown on civil society in Libya.

22) Such is the case of Tanweer, an organization targeted for their focus on issues considered by Libyan authorities to be antagonistic to the state and Islam, specifically their work campaigning for women’s and LGBTQ+ rights in Libya. Tanweer’s members have endured violations and abuse including torture, verbal abuse, and threats. Between November 2021 and March 2022, seven members of the organization were taken into custody without valid reason by the ISA under the Western government in Tripoli. The ISA subsequently shared video of their ‘confessions’ on Facebook, where they appear to admit to identifying as ‘atheists,’ ‘non-religious’, ‘secularists’, and ‘feminists’, and to promoting atheism and disdain for religious beliefs through social media platforms.

23) In the videos published by the ISA, these individuals’ confessions include communicating with international organizations such as Amnesty International, as well as the names and locations of diaspora Libyan activists, Libyan journalists within Libya who are ‘supportive of atheism’, and other Libyan human rights defenders within the country. Due to these clear threats to the safety of members of Tanweer, as of 13 March 2022, the organization was dissolved and its board members have fled the country. The Tripoli-based CSC also enabled⁴ this crackdown. On 27 March, the CSC issued a statement confirming its full support for the campaign of arrests, describing Tanweer as an illegal organization working against the ‘values of Libyan conservative Muslim society’.

24) In another case of repression against civil society activists, Mansour Atti Al-Maghrabi, who headed the Red Crescent branch of Ajdabiya in northeastern Libya, and the Ajdabiya branch of the CSC, was abducted near his workplace on 3 June 2021. He was held for several days by the ISA before being transferred to Tariq bin Ziyad Prison from June 2021 to March 2022. He was questioned by the ISA- Ajdabiya, affiliated to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces under the command of Khalifa Haftar. He told CIHRS that questioning pertained to his activism and involvement in trying to organize the monitoring work of civil society ahead of then legislative elections.

25) Previously, in May 2022, a meeting was held that included the CSC, the Central Bank of Libya, the ISA, the General Intelligence Service, and the General Authority for Awqaf and Islamic Affairs (Ministry of Islamic Affairs). The meeting aimed to coordinate efforts among these bodies to confront what they described as the ‘threat of organizations’. During the meeting, several measures were agreed upon, including the closure and freezing of bank accounts belonging to organizations that had not renewed their annual registration. As a result, many organizations faced account closures and asset freezes.

26) The Aman Organization for Combating Racial Discrimination, which operates in southern Libya and has held a bank account since 2012, had its account frozen and funds seized in 2022. The bank refused to lift the freeze unless the organization re-registered under Regulation No. 286—a regulation that was suspended in July 2022—resulting in the continued freeze of the account to this day.

27) The Libya Film Foundation also had its bank account frozen, and it remains frozen to this day. The foundation was required to re-register and renew its registration as a condition for lifting the freeze.

28) On 13 May 2023, the ISA arrested an employee of the Italian organization ‘Ara Pacis’ and its legal representative in southern Libya, accusing them of cooperating with a foreign organization to settle immigrants in southern Libya.

29) Utilizing national security and religious rhetoric, Libyan state apparatuses have targeted activists and CSOs, accusing them of ideologies and acts against religious morality. In June 2023, Imad Mustafa Trabelsi, the Under-Secretary-General of the Ministry of Interior, sent a formal memorandum to Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, the Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity. In the memo, Trabelsi accused international human rights organizations of operating under an ‘unauthorized’ Civil Society Commission and engaging in activities that supposedly contravene Islamic Sharia, national laws, and societal norms, like promoting atheism and homosexuality; accusations that are both misleading and dangerous.

30) Similarly, in a press conference⁵ on 5 February 2025, Lotfi al-Harari, head of the ISA in western Libya, accused⁶ CSOs of espionage, proselytism, and incitement to homosexuality.

31) In a press statement dated 2 April 2025, the ISA further vilified civil society groups, accusing them of promoting ‘atheism, Christianism, homosexuality, moral corruption, and resettlement [of migrants]’. The ISA also announced the closure of ten international NGOs, including the Norwegian Refugee Council, Doctors Without Borders, and International Rescue Committee, accusing them of interfering with Libyan sovereignty and supporting migrants and refugees in ways that aim to settle them in Libya and destabilize the country.

32) The CSC has also participated in inflammatory rhetoric against civil society. In one of the most recent examples, the Commission’s branch in Benghazi criticized⁷ the reaction of civil society groups who issued statements against hate speech targeting migrants and refugees in Libya, and described them as ‘a direct threat to Libya’s security’.

Recommendations

1. Repeal Law No. 19 of 2001, Law No. 80 of 1975, and any related provisions that arbitrarily restrict civil society. Work with national legal experts, CSOs, and UN technical support to draft, without delay, a replacement legislation that conforms to international standards.
2. Create a non-partisan civil society authority, independent of the executive and security services.
3. Abolish the requirement for annual renewals and prior approval for foreign funding and projects.
4. Establish a national commission to investigate arbitrary detentions, coercion, and abuse of activists by the ISA and militia groups.
5. Issue a formal government statement condemning hate speech and misinformation targeting CSOs.

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